Commonality is important for the cooperation between cultures in human society. Working together for a common cause is what brings diversity together to act harmoniously with each other. However, when basing commonality on uniformity dominant society excludes certain cultures it views as deviant. These deviant groups exist in a degraded & marginalized state that impedes the individual pursuit of the good and stands in contradiction with liberal values. Universal citizenship strives for uniformity in society, which fails the democratic ideal of including all-affected due to inherent differences that encourage exclusion. Liberal democratic states must maintain unity not uniformity, which requires transformative change in the face of a paradox.
Universal citizenship in democracy promotes uniformity through abstract equality. Young (1989) describes universal citizenship as originally structured for man. It is defined generally instead of with particularities. Its laws and rules are said & applied uniformly to all meaning it is blind to individual and group differences within society, which is abstract equality. The argument of uniformity is that it is necessary to create a general will of the people. However, Young points that the ideal of universal citizenship excludes groups judged as incapable of adopting the general will and acts to enforce homogeneity of citizens. It is easier to build unity with uniformity requiring exclusion. The infamous White Paper (1969) illustrates what happens when you apply universal citizenship overtop other groups. The White Paper viewed the hardships of First Nations as the separation from dominant society through difference in legal status. The White Paper was to bring First Nations under the abstract equality of the law. First Nations could then share the same services and programs of all Canadians. The outright rejection of the White Paper by First Nations illustrates that not all citizens are the same. “Difference-blind principles” represent a singular hegemonic culture that imposes its uniformity overtop of other cultures ignoring difference (Taylor, 1992 p. 43). First Nation communities are a different society and will not conform to the hegemonic culture represented by the White Paper The hegemonic cultural framework of Canada evolved out of its favouritism with European immigrants. Banting & Thompson’s research shows that 96% of the Canadian population in the 1960s had European ancestry and that only 2% of the population was indigenous; who were not yet politically mobilized. “Postwar policy regimes were shaped primarily by the concerns of a white European population divided primarily by ethnicity, language, and culture rather than race” (Banting & Thompson, p. 1). Canada favoured European immigrants because they were much easier to integrate into the economy. European dominance over Canadian policy undermined the ability of racial minorities to maximize their benefit in the democratic arena. Banting & Thompson state racial economic equality “has never been a major, explicit policy target in Canada” (p. 3). They also find that income differences between white ethnic groups are almost non-existent while racial-minority men face an earnings gap of approximately 10%” (p. 5). The inattention to racial differences creates a socioeconomic injustice. Therefore, as the dominant majority Europeans had more sway over policy decisions increasing their own benefits while racial minorities suffered. Group differentiated rights are needed to address the disparities in the private sphere that affect minority groups. The democratic ideal is political equality in decision-making that includes all-affected. Universal citizenship’s pursuit of uniformity leads to exclusion of certain groups meaning it is ill suiting for the democratic ideal. For, Young the “generality of the public” was dependent on the exclusion of women, and others (p. 254). Banting and Thompson’s research above showed the effects of exclusion on minority groups with an income gap, among others. Multiculturalism is a concept that “multiple cultures co-exist within a limited state-bounded territory” (Schuster & Solomos, 2001, p. 4). It arose out of globalization and the constant immigration flows that came with it. The pressure of immigration challenges the narrow definition of universal citizenship, which cannot meet demands of multiple cultural groups. Kymlicka (1995) clarifies an important distinction, which is that multiculturalism itself is not uniform but comprised of two main groups: “national minorities” and “ethnic groups” requiring self-government rights and polyethnic (accommodation) rights, respectfully (p. 6). Without group differentiated rights the majority renders “cultural minorities vulnerable to significant injustice” (Kymlicka, p. 5). Universal citizenship’s inability to mitigate the disparities between cultural minorities shows the need of differentiated citizenship. Kymlicka’s multiculturalism is limited in solving the problem of minority groups because of his instrumental view of culture. “For Kymlicka, culture as such has no intrinsic value; its value is largely instrumental” for the individual to make choices (Harris, 2001, p. 22). His instrumental view of culture see’s the demands of ethnic minorities as a demand to be included into dominant culture (Harris, p. 21). However, this instrumental view is the misrecognition of the intrinsic value of other cultures. Charles Taylor fills this critique with his politics of recognition. Taylor conveys an argument that recognition is an innate human need. “Equal recognition is not just the appropriate mode for a healthy democratic society. Its refusal can inflict damage on those who are denied it” (Taylor, p. 36). Identity crucially depends on dialogical relations with others. Because our identity is formed through dialogue it means there is sometimes a struggle against how ‘significant others’ see us who even in passing can still have influence over our identities (Taylor, p. 33). If our cultural identity was a choice then people would shed cultures that bring them harm. However, we see that is not the case. For example, Canada tried to assimilate indigenous communities through residential schools instead they suffered grotesque abuses leading to widespread misrecognition with ramifications like a higher suicide rate within their communities compared to the rest of Canada (Statistics Canada, 2016). The indigenous are not recognized as having a valuable culture, which causes cultural discrimination from dominant society. Taylor’s dialogical view of culture successfully challenges Kymlicka’s instrumental view of culture by promoting intrinsic value. The democratic problem is the absence of equal citizenship because of cultural misrecognition and economic disparities. Fraser states that both socioeconomic injustice and cultural injustice are pervasive in contemporary societies. We see this in the racial economic disparities and the higher suicide rates with First Nation communities. For Fraser, you cannot address the interior harms of misrecognition without the exterior dimensions of economic inequality, and vice versa. The contradiction Fraser points out is that redistribution promotes uniformity, while recognition promotes difference. This contradiction between the exterior and the interior forces of remediation means it is a systemic problem for democracy. Addressing either problem only compounds the other because those who suffer cultural and economic injustice “need both to claim and to deny their specificity” (Fraser, p. 74). Fraser calls these “bivalent collectivities” because of their dependence on both remedies, which she attaches to gender & race for her feminist critique of Taylor. The systemic contradiction of addressing bivalent collectivities leads Fraser to believe transformative change in society is needed to address economic & social injustices. The problem liberal democracy faces are too complex for a simple solution. The paradoxical nature of redistribution & recognition illustrates this. The paradox of maintaining societal unity, which requires uniformity while accepting each others differences. The question that comes to mind; is contemporary society capable of accepting irreducible differences in a unified way? And, if it is what would it look like? The answer is well out of reach for this paper and instead will be carried over to my next paper. Bibliography Banting & Thompson. The Puzzling Persistence of Racial Inequality in Canada. Fraser, N. From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a ‘Pos-Socialist’ Age. Taylor, C. (1992). Gurmann, A., Rockefeller, S., Walzer, M., & Wolf, S. (Eds.). Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition”: An Essay by Charles Taylor. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Harris, C. (2001). Beyond multiculturalism? Difference, recognition and social justice, Patterns of Prejudice, 35(1), 13-34, DOI: 10.1080/003132201128811043 Kymlicka, W. (1995). Multicultural Citizenship. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press. Schuster, L., & Solomos, J. (2001). Introduction: citizenship, multiculturalism, identity. Patterns of Prejudice, 35(1), 3-12, DOI: 10.1080/003132201128811034 Sørensen, G. (2006). Liberalism of Restraint and Liberalism of Imposition: Liberal Values and World Order in the New Millennium. International Relations, 20(3), 251-272 Statistics Canada. (2016). Aboriginal Peoples Survey, 2012. Retrieved from http://www.statcan.gc.ca/ The White Paper. (1969). Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy, 1969. Young, I. (1989). Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship. Ethics, 99(2), 250-274.
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Understanding the process of creating unity with difference requires us to look at our identities. Identities are reliant on Others making them intersubjective. The reliance on Others makes identities dynamic because of their dialogical nature. The dialogical nature of identities makes the monological top-down and uniform application of identity by the state paradoxical when dealing with recognition. To address top-down identities many authors of recognition articulate the need of a struggle for recognition, which highlights the competitive aspects of identity development. However, the slanted focus on the competitive aspect narrows the perspective of identity development. It is within this paper that I argue the focus on the struggle of recognition misses the importance of the cooperative functions needed for identity development, which is necessary to create unity with difference.
Recognition is an important part of human society. Authors like Axel Honneth (2001) and Charles Taylor (1992) both see recognition as fundamental to human society. Honneth explains recognition as a shared normative view between individuals and groups. Human “self-awareness is dependent upon the experience of social recognition” (Honneth, p. 46). Honneth clarifies that self-awareness comes through an intersubjective acquisition leading to moral progress. He proves that our identities are indeed constructed through dialogical means. His example that humans have physical & affective needs which, can only be validated directly through relationships shows the interdependence on Others. The premise is that love requires a “relationship of recognition [that] is tied to the bodily existence of concrete Others who reciprocate their feelings of special esteem” (p.48). Taylor also refers to identities being heavily influenced by significant others and their view of us. Therefore, recognition is a dynamic concept as its meaning depends on the specific moral perspective of each individual and group. It is through dialogical relationships with others that we find positive recognition. Honneth argues we acquire our self-confidence through positive recognition as we affirm our actions, needs, and wants. Recognition is tied to identity, which is shaped by our interactions through dialogical means. Identity becomes a dynamic concept because it is dialogical & intersubjective. Our “self-awareness is dependent upon the experience of social recognition” (Honneth, 2001, p.46). As individuals move between groups their self-awareness changes depending on the social environment. Gronlund, Herne, & Setala (2015) call this social comparison, which is the tendency for individuals to act in order to win social acceptance. The phenomenon of social comparison is also closely related to peer pressure, which encourages conformity within groups. Peer pressure doesn’t always work because it negotiates “through dialogue, partly overt, partly internal, with others” (Taylor, p. 34). Our level of conformity depends on our ability to maintain our own identities in group environments, which is different between individuals. Parekh (2009) refers to the effect of different groups on us as constructing our social identities, which are the compartments that comprise society (p. 273). These social identities can be internalized by the individual either through the brand of misrecognition or by positive self-acceptance. Our social identities are what make our personal identities fluid meaning recognition is also a dynamic concept. Parekh (2009) points out social identities can be constructed in endless variations as you can be identified to or by any trait where some of these groupings become socially relevant. “In a racially conscious society, black and white are socially signifigant categories,” and as such become subject to norms, relationships, stereotypes & modes of treatment (Parekh, p. 272). Singh’s (2014) conceptualizes top-down approaches of identity construction as state-centric & universalistic, which means that it is the state that grants recognition & compartmentalizes difference. The United States maintains the categories of identities through its Bureau of the Census, which is connected to other state functions that “produces and reproduces racial/ethnic identities through the classification of people, gathering of data and dissemination of information” (Gimenez, 2006, p. 428). Singh uses Foucalt’s definition of power as “a mode of action that structures the possible field of action of others” (p. 53). From the top-down perspective groups are pre-constructed and applied to individuals based on the required traits. Top-down approaches are linear because they need to be monological to maintain the status quo making them very resistant to change. Thus, group membership and association may be maintained through top-down approaches involving internal restrictions, such as the rule of law (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 7). Internal restrictions “refer to the right of a group to limit the liberty of its own individual members in the name of group solidarity or culture purity” (Kymlicka, p. 7). Internal restrictions are an important component to maintain distinct social identities, functions, and cultures but are usually self-maintained by the individuals involved. The state may also enact internal restrictions by limiting the availability of identities to the individual and control the definition of said identities. Top-down functions maintain monological social identities that are applied to individuals. It is in the top-down application of identity that we find one of the roots to misrecognition. Parekh’s (2009) views society as comprised by a system of identities, which creates certain privileges, norms & modes of discipline (p. 273). “Society often seeks to ensure that its members not only conform to the demands of, but internalize their social identities, that is, identify themselves in terms of the categories to which they belong” (Parekh, p. 273). Group identities may suffer from negative attachments requiring a struggle against society’s definition of them or else succumb to the harmful effects of misrecognition. It also means that individuals may be forced into categories when certain group identities are invisible or unrecognized by dominant society, which may also require a struggle to become visible. These top-down approaches constrain power by limiting the threshold needed to author an original identity. Misrecognition happens when a personal identity is misrepresented with a social identity or when social identity maintains negative meanings for the group or individual. Honneth (2001) & Taylor (1992) argue that recognition often starts from these negative contexts requiring a struggle. Proper recognition supposedly requires a struggle of acceptance “for claims regarding their own identity” (Honneth, p. 47). Taylor claims that misrecognition causes individuals to “internalize a picture of their own inferiority” (p. 25). It is on the basis of having your personal identity subordinate to social identities, which are given to us with negative meanings that create misrecognition. Consequently, there is a competitive element to identity formation to achieve positive recognition. However, Taylor alludes to a cooperative element to identity and recognition when he states that “we define our identity always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the things our significant others want to see in us” (p. 33). Cooperation is important for identity development. For example, good mentors have many values but the main ones are: a willingness to share their skills & knowledge, values the opinions & initiatives of others, value ongoing learning & growth, and will provide guidance & constructive feedback (Franchise Growth Partners, 2011). Mentors maintain the dialogical process through constructive feedback that encourages critical thinking but awards more control over the development of identity to the individual. They work with individuals to help shape identity in a cooperative relationship removing the need of a struggle. The semantic focus on the competitive concept of a struggle against misrecognition narrows the approach to understanding identity formation. The goal here also is to highlight that the struggle of identity is based on a power-over structure. Joanna Macy (1998) explains power-over as a worldview that assumes “reality to be composed of discrete and separate entities”. The power-over worldview enacts strict categorical boundaries to maintain dominance. It is a competition of “one’s will over others, limiting their choices.” She claims that the power-over worldview creates the perception of a zero-sum game, which pits groups against one another because society has a mentality that “if you win, I lose”. It also promotes rigidity as a premise of being more powerful (p. 52). However, this train of thought rides contradictory to the premise of a dialogical identity, which we understand as being fluid. As well, if our identities are intersubjective they cannot and should not be viewed as discrete and separate as they are intertwined. The power-over paradigm becomes paradoxical in dealing with the politics of recognition. Yanofsky (2016) explains that “a paradox is present when an assumption is made and then, with valid reasoning, a contradiction or falsity is derived” (p. 166). He claims that “a paradox is a proof that the assumption is not a valid part of reason” (p. 166). The power-over paradox illustrates a limitation to the ability of the current paradigmatic worldview in dealing with the politics of recognition. The power-over paradigm is unable to deal with the complexity of identities. Borrowing an example from Parekh (2009): “Take citizenship. Some might see it as a purely instrumental relationship. Their country means nothing to them, and they obey its laws out of crude or enlightened self-interest. Some might see citizenship as a moral relationship, and conscientiously obey its laws out of gratitude, a sense of fair play, or obligations of reciprocity. They could as well be in some other country, and their moral relationship to it would remain the same. Yet others might identify with the country, see it as theirs, feel protective and possessive about it, love it, and see it as part of their social and personal identity” (p. 274). Essentially, each individual can perceive identities differently despite sharing them. The internet further complicates power-over structures of identity. A power-over paradigm would not allow for these differing understandings of a singular identity as it conflicts with rigid categorical definitions of top-down approaches. Fenton (2016) illustrates the impact of space-time compression that facilitates international communication “while requiring minimal resources and bureaucracy.” The internet offers social empowerment through participation and gives voice to identities that would otherwise be invisible as people can now connect and form groups over vast distances (p. 25). The increased connectivity leads to new identities and the ability to form digital communities around them. Doing so subverts the ability of the state’s top-down approaches to maintain control of identities that can now be transnational. Crenshaw (1991) states that the problem with identity politics isn’t that it transcends difference but that it “conflates or ignores difference” where “ignoring difference within groups contributes to tensions among groups” (p.1242). Crenshaw illustrates the importance of the concept of “intersectionality” where individuals are also compounded by holding multiple identities, such as being a black queer woman, which can create multiple layers of subordination. Crenshaw calls it a structural intersectionality where multiple pre-constructed identities are working against you. Therefore, identities are multidimensional with vertical, horizontal and diagonal structures that maintain a dynamic equilibrium of the dialogical identity. As identities are multidimensional with dynamic equilibriums power-over structures are inadequate in managing differences within society. Recognition requires attention to power-with functions. Power-with functions are both constructive and deconstructive processes impacting identity. Referring back to the example of the mentor and identity development we view it as a bottom-up function where the mentee is assumed to have no identity. It is through the power-with process of mentoring that their identity is constructed. However, the process would also be deconstructive to identities that may have been internalized. The struggle Honneth (2001) and Taylor (1992) talk about is a deconstructive process to remove the structures that are constraining your authentic identity, whether they are from the state, a group and/or yourself. “Those involved struggle over and through the modes of mutual recognition intertwined with” the normative structures in place making it a counter-hegemonic process (Singh, 2014, p. 50-51). But, recognition requires cooperation from others as a form of acceptance to your authentic identity. Therefore, power-with functions are necessary for authentic identity development that affords recognition. Forming unity between differing groups requires power-with functions paired with intersectional structures as necessities to forming a shared identity. Stephan Martineau (2007) offers a strong example for this in his case study “Humanity, Forest Ecology, and the Future in a British Columbia Valley,” which gives insight into the usefulness of power-with functions for unifying differences between identities. The case study involves resolving a 35-year conflict in Slocan Valley over deforestation practices. Slocan Valley has a diverse population of ~6,000 with a variety of groups including multiple immigrant groups, indigenous people, government and a logging corporation, among others. The main problem was the contamination of clean drinking water due to sediment run off from clear cuts and an inability to create unity in offering a solution to the issue. The conflict of identity worsened after the BC government held nine failed round tables, which led to further group polarization (p. 35). Each group expressed their identity to the forest differently. Their group identities were struggling for recognition in the community in relation to the forest, which was dominated by the identities of the government and the logging corporation. These groups also the communities fall within structural intersections of identity that struggle for recognition. Martineau was able to resolve the community’s divisive problem by focusing on a power-with approach. His guiding principles were recognizing the diverse perspectives & value systems of the differing groups. These differences are formed through the diverse individual intersections where each unique culture are “guided and influenced by a mix of social, economic, scientific, spiritual, psychological, cultural, political, historical and institutional lenses” (p. 36). Each identity offers a valuable perspective that is relevant to the iss and therefore must be included in the process (p. 36). By creating a safe space that allowed individuals to open up Martineau, as an intermediary, was able to find the values of each groups unique identity. He was then able to articulate them as shared values between groups leading to the formation of a common identity. The common identity involved an articulated vision of a thriving community (economically & socially) in a healthy ecosystem. Martineau power-with mentality led to the construction of a unified identity that recognized the different group identities overcoming internal differences. Understanding that identities are intersubjective is important as it means our identities are formed through dialogue with Others making them dynamic. Our identities are dynamic because of constantly changing social contexts, which define social identities differently making recognition a dynamic concept as well. Crenshaw articulates an important note with the concept of intersectionality that individuals may hold multiple identities in a single moment, which makes both recognition and identity multidimensional. Group identities, such as in the case study Slocan Valley, are also subject to Crenshaw’s structural intersectionality. The problem of power-over, or top-down, functions is that they maintain monological definitions within distinct and separate categories, or structures, of identity that creates a focus on a struggle for recognition. Therefore, power-over functions are contradictory in dealing with identity and recognition, which are both dialogical and interdependent. Power-with functions mixed with structural intersectionality conceptualize a model that better understands identities. This combination allows greater development of authentic identities, whether for the individual or the group. More importantly power-with intersectionality affords unity between groups without the paradox of uniformity by creating a new shared identity that works alongside the continuation of differing group identities. Bibliography: Crenshaw, K. (1991). Mapping the margins: intersectionality, identity politics, and violence against women of color. Stanford Law Review: 43(6), 1241-1299. Fenton, N. (2016). Digital Political Radical. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Franchise Growth Partners. (2011). Top 10 qualities of a good mentor. Retrieved from http://franchisegrowthpartners.com/mentoring Gimenez, M. (2006). With a little class: a critique of identity politics. Ethnicities; 6(3), 423-439. Gronlund, K., Herne, K., & Setala, M. (2015). Does enclave deliberation polarize opinions?. Political Behaviour; 37(4), 995-1020. Honneth, A (2001) "Recognition or Redistribution? Changing Perspectives on the Moral Order of Society" Theory, Culture & Society vol. 18 no. 2-3 43-55 Kymlicka, W. (1995). Multicultural Citizenship. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press Taylor, C. (1992). (Eds.). (1992). Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition”: An Essay by Charles Taylor.(edited and commentary by Gurmann, A., Rockefeller, S., Walzer, M., & Wolf, S.) Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Parekh, B. (2009). Logic of identity. Politics, philosophy & economics; 8(3), 267-284. Macy, J. (1998). Coming Back to Life. New Society Publishers. Martineau, S. (2007). Humanity, forest ecology, and the future in a british Columbia valley: a case study. Integral Review; 6(4), 26-43 Singh, . (2014). Recognition versus self-determination: dilemmas of emancipatory politics (edited by Eisenberg, A., Webber, J., Coulthard, G., & Boisselle, A.). Ethnicity and democratic governance series. Vancouver: UBC Press Yanofsky, N. (2016, May-June). Paradoxes, Contradictions, and the Limits of Science. American Scientist; 104, 166-173 |
AuthorRobin Gagne: OtterSide Media: Writer: Researcher: Creative ArchivesCategories |
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